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Abstract
Within this paper, we analyze the fulfillment of the Kyoto-emissions reduction commitment
exemplary in Germany and its implication on long-term paths of all macro-variables. Germany,
like all other industrial or Annex B countries, has to reduce its emissions by 2010 and after
what we call a "Kyoto-forever-scenario". We exemplary investigate tradable permits as reduc-
tion measures in a national OverLapping Generations (OLG)-model, where we change the dis-
counting technique by using generation adjusted discounting (GAD) in comparison to conven-
tional OLG-models. We show that within our model-framework Germany is able to develop
along growing paths of e.g. GDP in sharp contrast to conventional results of OLG-simulations.
At the same time, nowadays living generations have to share higher burdens in terms of lower
GDP, per capita consumption and employment which can be interpreted, firstly, as contempo-
rary costs for reaching sustainable paths and, secondly, contributions for internalizing in-
tertemporal external effects. However, all costs in terms of lower macro-variables for current
living generations are overcompensated by higher future values of them. This effect can be
interpreted as intertemporal application of full cost-bearance, or, in other words, the polluter
pay principle which is oriented on the sustainability of GHG abatement.
Non technical abstract
This paper investigates the sustainability of the German economy when reaching the Kyoto
emissions reduction target. We use a special intergenerational discounting technique which
actually takes into account intergenerational peculiarities in an overlapping generations mod-
eling framework which leads to completely different statements than using the same model
with a conventional discounting method. By applying this discounting technique sustainable
growth paths of all economic variables can be reached with respect to overall welfare units  at
the expense of currently living ones. Their contribution to the achievement of "sustainability"
can be interpreted as an application of an intertemporal polluter pays principle, where (nega-
tive) intertemporal externalities are - to a large extent - avoided. This is not only fair from a
normative viewpoint, but also efficient due to the internalization of today's occurring external
costs with respect to climate change.
JEL-Classification: D58, D61, Q28, Q38, Q48.
Keywords: OLG-models, Discounting, Sustainability, Climate Change, Kyoto Targets.
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1 Introduction
One of the milestones in international climate policy was the third conference of the Parties
(COP-3) in Kyoto 1997. Leading industrialized countries committed themselves in Annex-B of
the Kyoto-Protocol to reduce six GHG's on basis 1990 within the commitment period from
2008 to 2012 by at least 5.2%. Within our paper, we concentrate on the fulfillment of the
Kyoto-commitments in specific industrialized countries, especially Germany. Therefore, we
assume a so-called "Kyoto-forever-scenario",1 which means that Germany has to reduce its
GHG-emissions by 21% until the year 2150. We analyze national reduction measures, exem-
plary tradable permits, in an OLG-model, where we change the discounting technique in com-
parison to conventional OLG-models and illustrate that long-term paths of major macro-vari-
ables are developing in a complete different manner.
Our analysis abstracts from infinitely living Ramsey-type-agents and, therefore, from optimal
growth theory. OLG-models depict empirical circumstances more realistically even though
Manne (Manne 1999) as well as Stephan et al. (Stephan et al. 1998) conclude that there are no
significant differences between both types of models. The discounting technique used in most
of all models are typically very similar, i.e. each generation maximizes the present value of life-
time-utilities. Therefore, future utility units are discounted to the beginning of their respective
lives. Welfare present values are calculated by discounting generation-specific utilities to the
beginning of the planning horizon using the "social discount rate".2 Generation-specific myopia
equals the myopic attitude of a central planner who sums up all generation-specific present
values. We refrain from this very strong assumption (see chapter 2), because the assumed dis-
counting technique biases in favor of current living generations and discriminates against future
ones and is, therefore, not "neutral" in an intergenerational framework. Tol (Tol 1999) as well
as Bayer (Bayer 2000) analyzed different kinds of discounting measures and their impacts on
climate change and economic reactions. They both found out that the discounting method has
substantial impacts on long-term emission control and short run emission abatement.
Howarth (Howarth 1998) shows that welfare statements heavily depend on transfer assump-
tions between different generations. One result is that in a "utilitarian moral model" aggressive
abatement measures can be legitimated. This is due to the renunciation of discounting utilities
in the intertemporal welfare function. Howarth argues from an ethical point of view and as-
                                               
1 World economic implications by meeting the Kyoto target are described in Kemfert (1999), sensitivity analy-
sis due to emissions baseline variations and limitations of Emissions Trading is written in Kemfert (2000).
2 See Blanchard/Fischer (1989), pp. 98-100.
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sumes moral duties towards future living generations which have to be taken into account by
current living ones. More aggressive abatement is thus being demanded by current generations
than in the reference case where positive utility discounting is applied.
Distributional aspects are focal points within investigations by Stephan et al. (Stephan/Müller-
Fürstenberger 1998, Stephan et al. 1997), Manne (Manne 1999), Nordhaus (Nordhaus 1994,
who argues in a Ramsey-type-model) and the more qualitative paper by Schelling (Schelling
1995) as well. In general, they argue that distributional reasons are the most important argu-
ments for not abate at all (or, respectively, not as aggressive as in the paper by Howarth). If
today's living generations would heavily abate, future generations will not only be wealthier
due to conventional capital accumulation but also due to returns induced by GHG-abatement.
On the other hand, renunciation of GHG-abatement leads to more equal distributional effects.
Conventional capital formation is used more intensively which leads to increasing consumption
and investment possibilities for future generations. At the same time decreases "green capital"
which leads to welfare losses for future generations. Irreversibilities as well as peculiarities of
the global climate are neglected. The possibility of dramatic wealth reductions due to global
warming is completely ignored, and - as is usual in neoclassical environmental and resources
economic theory - environmental and man-made capital is assumed to almost fully be substitut-
able. Losses in environmental capital can completely be compensated by increasing man-made
capital units.
Gerlagh (Gerlagh 1999) and Gerlagh/Van der Zwaan (Gerlagh/van der Zwaan 1999) illustrate
that climate change measures depend on the implementation of property rights. If they are
grandfathered within all nowadays living generations (e.g. tradable permits are distributed
within all today's living generations according to their historical per capita emissions), sus-
tainable paths cannot be reached and the economy moves on inefficient paths. This changes if
the distribution of property rights is carried out according to a "trust fund-idea": Each future
living individual obtains the same amount of pollution rights as today living ones. This allo-
cation of property rights leads to an efficient path in the economy. Additionally, Gerlagh/van
der Zwaan presume increasing life-expectancies of all affected individuals, but the line of ar-
gument does not change much. They further stress the importance of the polluter pays princi-
ple which is no point of interest in all the other models we referred to. Of course, for practical
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policy the polluter pays principle is the most important normative as well as positive criterion
for the implementation of any instruments in environmental policy.3
However, complete intergenerational comparisons have not been carried out in all mentioned
models. It is, firstly, insufficient to conclude like Manne, Stephan et al. and Nordhaus that due
to intertemporal transfers from current to future living generations it is necessary to refrain
from abatement measures, or - less stringent - to cut emissions not as sharp as necessary.
These transfers do of course increase (decrease) generation-specific welfare levels. However,
from a societal point of view - having in mind welfare levels of all affected generations - oc-
curring distributional effects are not the "core problem", especially if we assume drastic envi-
ronmental losses as a result of not abate GHG-emissions at all. A more meaningful objective is
the overall efficiency in terms of GDP-shares of all affected generations in total. Secondly, re-
flections with respect to "sustainability", especially measured according to the non-declining-
welfare-criterion, where different GDP-paths are used as indicator for utilities, are not under-
taken in the most of the mentioned analyses - except the investigations by Gerlagh (1999) and
Gerlagh/van der Zwaan (1999). It is worth to compare GDP-paths which result by using
"conventional" discounting techniques and a modified one - Generation Adjusted Discounting
(GAD, see below) - with respect to long-term sustainable growth. Additionally, full cost-
bearance of all GHG-emitting generations according to the polluter pays principle means that
each generation has to internalize their external costs of GHG-emissions. Intertemporal exter-
nalities have to be avoided which is done by reducing long-term discount rates according to the
idea of GAD. Risk-averse - and even risk-neutral - climate policy has to take into account that
GHG-abatement should be undertaken in these generations which pollute and emit GHG, re-
spectively. We will show, that in sharp contrast to conventional OLG-models, the implementa-
tion of the polluter pays principle leads to sharper emissions reductions and, additionally,
higher GDP-losses for today's living generations. However, these costs are more than compen-
sated by reaching strictly monotonous increasing GDP-paths which overcompensate welfare
losses of current living generations. Arguing from a societal viewpoint, aggregated overall
welfare increases by implementing GAD in comparison to conventional discounting.
                                               
3 The polluter pays principle requires full cost-bearance of all individuals and, therefore, reflects individual and
generational responsibility. Economically, it simply states that everybody who takes advantage of (environmen-
tal) goods or services has to pay for it, see Cansier (1996), pp. 128-129.
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2 Generation Adjusted Discounting (GAD)
Discounting in intertemporal decision-making is of highest importance for reaching efficient
paths of all macroeconomic variables. Even marginal changes in the discount rate modify the
results of cost-benefit analyses. Usually, simulation models show highest sensitivities of dis-
count rate changes for intertemporal paths of all macro-variables. However, they do not con-
centrate on the most interesting question sufficiently: Is the well-known discounting technique
adequately applied in intergenerational decision making? Neither the descriptive nor the pre-
scriptive approach depict intergenerational peculiarities completely.4
The conventional application of discounting-techniques in OLG- as well as in Ramsey-models
distorts intertemporal decisions in favor of current living generations and discriminates against
future living ones. Our discounting method - the GAD5 - avoids such distortions implementing
the following key assumption: As soon as the oldest currently living generation dies, the dis-
count rate is lowered according to the extent of the intragenerational myopic factor for societal
present value calculations. This means, during each generations lifetime we use higher discount
rates in comparison to intergenerational calculations. As a consequence, carbon abatement
effects in the remote future are not as heavily discounted. The reason for a lower
intergenerational discount rate is the irrelevance of the pure time preference rate which can
only be observed in individual decisions and is, therefore, not applicable for intergenerational,
societal comparisons. Thus, the GAD does not penalize current living generations due to
higher weights for future living ones in societal decision-making, it furthermore implements the
necessity of equal treatment of all affected generations which is the central requirement of
utilitarianism where neoclassical theory is based upon.
However, in sharp contrast to the original GAD-approach we still employ a social discount
rate for intergenerational comparisons which relates to utility units. This is due to the general
equilibrium framework of our analysis. The idea of GAD is fulfilled by reducing the elasticity
of marginal utilities with respect to consumption within the lifetime of each generation.6 Di-
minishing marginal utility does not moderate effects occurring in the future as drastically as in
                                               
4 See Arrow et al. (1996), pp. 131-134.
5 See for further details Bayer (2000) and Bayer/Cansier (1999).
6 More precisely, our discounting approach could be labeled "modified GAD" because of two principle differ-
ences to the original GAD: Firstly, the lower elasticity of marginal utility is analogic to the original GAD-
approach with respect to its effect in intergenerational comparisons, although we still employ a positive pure
time preference rate for intergenerational present value calculations. Secondly and minor important, original
GAD has been developed for second-best frameworks where the opportunity cost rate usually exceeds the time
preference rate. This is, of course, not the case in first-best models.
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the reference case of OLG-models; the implicit long-term or intergenerational discount rate
with respect to consumption growth is of lower value. In other words: Future effects are not as
sharp discounted as in "conventional" OLG-models. From a societal viewpoint, future effects
are taken into account to a larger extent leading to future peculiarities representing higher pre-
sent values and significance in our model-framework. Apparent occurring negative as well as
positive effects influence today's decisions to a far more extent than in non-modified models.
3 Model description
We use a model named GOLD (Generation Overlapping Discounting)7 which is a dynamic general
equilibrium model for Germany considering individual generations within an overlapping genera-
tions framework (OLG) of finite lived agents. At each point in time a new generation of n identical
individuals is born, each period covers thirty five years of working, so that individuals have seventy
year life spans. In contrast to the Ramsey-type-model characterized by a representative infinite agent
maximizing utility through consumption over time, this OLG model encompasses different types of
generations each of them living a separate life cycle.
One household born in period g chooses a consumption path Cg,p maximizing its utility by con-
sidering the intertemporal budget constraint:
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where s represents the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption (the inverse of
the intertemporal substitution elasticity), r depicts the (additional) pure time preference rate of
all living generations and Mg shows the present value of income.8
The model is based on the German statistical input output table of 1993. The economic sectors
of the German input output table is aggregated and mapped to production sectors, of which 6
are energy sectors (soft- and hard coal, gas, oil, oil products and electricity). At a specific point
in time, a backstop technology is available. All products are demanded by intermediate pro-
duction, exports, investment and a representative consumer. All market actors behave within a
full competition context, i.e. they take the market price as given. Firms choose investment in
order to maximize the present value of their companies. Consumption is split by different gen-
erations and households which choose their optimal lifetime utility for their specific life cycle.
                                               
7 The mathematical description of the model is demonstrated in the Appendix.
8 The additional pure time preference rate r is being introduced to implement GAD. We use a discount and
time preference rate of 3% for our calculations.
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A generation is defined by the sum of households living at the same time. A household born in
period g lives its lifetime periods g+LT. Each household maximizes its individual consumption
path under their budget constraints which implicitly determines the level of savings. The trade-
off between current consumption and savings is given by a constant intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. The present value of income is determined by the specific labor and non labor
income of each household, savings of every lifetime period is determined by a difference of the
present value of future income and expenditures. In the beginning of each period the sum of
savings of all agents living within this period is equivalent to the demanded capital stock when
moving along equilibrium steady state optimal growth paths. The interest rate is determined by
the future capital price equivalent to the discounted present value of capital. Considering a
period determined budget constraint, the government has to balance its income and expendi-
tures in each period.
In each region production of the non-energy macro good is captured by an aggregate produc-
tion function which characterizes technology through transformation possibilities on the output
side and substitution possibilities on the input side. Goods are produced for the domestic and
for the export market. Production of the energy aggregate is described by a CES-function
which reflects substitution possibilities for different fossil fuels (i.e., coal, gas, and oil) and
capital, labor representing trade-off effects with a constant elasticity of substitution.9 Fossil
fuels are produced from fuel-specific resources and the non-energy macro good subject to a
CES-technology. The elasticity of substitution between the resource input and non-energy in-
puts is calibrated to meet a given price elasticity of supply. Exhaustion leads to rising fossil fuel
prices at constant demand quantities. The carbon-free backstop technology establishes an up-
per bound on the world oil price. This backstop fuel is a perfect substitute for the three fossil
fuels and is available in infinite supply at constant price, which is calculated to be a multiple of
the world oil price in the benchmark year. Producers invest as long as the marginal return on
investment equals the marginal cost of capital formation. The rates of return are determined by
a uniform and endogenous interest rate such that the marginal productivity of a unit of invest-
ment and a unit of consumption is equalized (first-best assumption).
Domestic and imported varieties for the non-energy good for all buyers in the domestic market are
treated as incomplete substitutes by a CES-Armington aggregation function providing a constant
elasticity of substitution. With respect to trade in energy, fossil fuels are treated as perfect substi-
tutes, net trade cannot be cross-moved. International capital flows reflect borrowing and lending at
                                               
9 We use a substitution elasticity of capital and labor and energy of 0.8.
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the world interest rate, and are endogenous subject to an intertemporal balance of payments con-
straint considering no changes in net indebtedness over the entire model horizon.
Germany has to meet its emissions reduction target committed by the Kyoto protocol within the
commitment period of 2008 to 2012. Within our model we assume - for example -, emission limits
induce a system of emission permits tradable within this region such that the marginal costs of
abatement are equalized across sectors. The permit price is then equivalent to a domestic carbon tax
which would be necessary to achieve the given emission limit. We assume within our model calcu-
lations that the Kyoto emissions reduction target is reached even after the commitment period of
2010 ("Kyoto-forever").10
4 Results
Within each scenario, Germany has to meet its emissions reduction target reached by domestic
abatement measures. In the first scenario, we use the conventional OLG discounting procedure
and in the second scenario, we use the adjusted GAD discounting procedure described in part
two of this paper. All numbers are expressed in total or percentage values in comparison to the
so called Business As Usual scenario (BAU) where no climate change strategies are imple-
mented.
The model horizon comprise 150 years t=0,10,...,T=150, i.e. 15 periods with 10 years periods.
In order to simulate the impacts of terminal constraints, simulation results are demonstrated for
all 150 years. Each household or cohort lives 7 periods (LT: 0,10,...,LT), that means 70 years,
within a model horizon of 150 years as described in Figure 1.11 Three types of cohorts can be
distinguished: 1. households born before t=0 dying within the model horizon, 2. households
whose life cycle include birth and death within the reflected model horizon (0£ t £ T=150), and
3. households born within but dying after the considered model horizon. At each period in
time, seven cohorts are alive, at initial time t=0 the index of births g encompass considered
periods of –60 to 150 because cohorts born before the reflected time horizon have also impacts
on model results. Income of each household grows within time period 20 to 40 and diminishes
after period 40.
                                               
10 Of course, there exists the possibility to induce increasing GHG-abatement measures by (sharp) devaluations
of permission rights which can be undertaken by the national authorities.
11 Although we argue in an OLG-model, each generation is allowed to bequeath not spent fortune to their de-
scendants.
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Figure 1: Time horizon and overlapping generations
Within this context, all results of the implementation of GAD changes are exposed as outcome
in comparison to the original model-results. Therefore, we concentrate on the most important
macro-variables in the following four figures (figures 2 to 5). GHG-emissions and GHG-con-
centrations in the atmosphere are not of high importance within this paper due to the explicitly
given and binding Kyoto emissions reduction target.
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Figure 2: GDP Changes in % comparison to the BAU case
Model results demonstrate the GAD discounting procedure as adjustment measure towards a
polluter pays principle: within the reflected time period of the first 70 years younger genera-
tions have to pay the burden in order to reduce emissions (see figure 2). Because of increased
investment within former time periods generations living after period 70 benefit from this de-
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velopment and are able to increase their welfare. In the conventional OLG discounting proce-
dure, GDP decreases within the first time periods less durable as in the longer periods because
older generations consummate their capital increases and income of previous periods. Young
generations earn mainly labor, older generation primarily capital income. GDP declines in the
long run much more than in the GAD scenario where we find positive GDP changes after pe-
riod 90. It seems that we will be faced with drastic GDP-losses due to GHG emissions reduc-
tions in the early periods of the planning horizon. In contrast, within the OLG scenario we de-
tect only slight differences to the BAU GDP-path for the first 30 years, but especially starting
with the year 2060, the GDP-losses in the GAD scenario are not as sharp as in the OLG case.
Beginning with 2090, the GAD scenario leads to increasing GDP which is never realized in the
OLG scenario. The differences between our two approaches will become even larger if we
would extend our planning horizon due to the increasing GDP path in the GAD scenario and
the decreasing one in the OLG case. This can mainly be explained by the assumption of grow-
ing GDP paths of 1.5 to 2 % in the BAU case and might be different if we use lower growth
rates due to varying factor productivities.
Thus, first generations have to accept higher GDP and welfare losses in terms of employment,
consumption as well as GDP in order to reach the Kyoto emissions reduction target, older
generations benefit not only by an improved environmental situation (which is not accounted in
real numbers in this model) but also by an improved economic situation. Overall analyses
which are strictly oriented on aggregated welfare levels of all affected generations throughout
the whole planning horizon cannot ignore that the GAD approach leads to higher aggregated
GDP present values for all affected generations.
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Figure 3: Investment changes in comparison to the BAU case
Our considerations are now demonstrated having a closer look on the path of net investments.
In both scenarios, net investments are increased in the next 30 years by about 2 % compared to
the BAU. In the GAD scenario, investments are augmented ten more years up to almost 3 %.
Afterwards, the enhancement is being reduced. In the GAD scenario, a long-term net invest-
ment increase is still observable at the end of the planning horizon, whereas in the OLG case
net investments are negative after the year 2080. Obviously, this leads to decreasing absolute
GDP-levels as well, which can be seen in figure 2.
Concentrating on employment and per capita consumption changes confirm our observations
with respect to GDP and net investment.
Bayer/Kemfert: Reaching national Kyoto targets and sustainable development 14
Employment in %
-1,2
-1
-0,8
-0,6
-0,4
-0,2
0
0,2
0,4
0,6
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
Time
%
GAD OLG
Figure 4: Employment changes in % in comparison the BAU scenario
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Figure 5: Changes of per capita consumption
Augmented investment because of intergenerational lower discount rates induce an increasing
GDP of long run living generations. Welfare changes of each generation can be described by
employment and consumption figures for both scenarios which show the same structure of
development. Within a sectoral consideration, mainly energy intensive sectors like all energy
sectors, iron and chemical industry are suffering because of drastic emission and energy re-
duction obligations. Less energy intensive industries like the service sector or sectors using less
energy intensive technologies receive investment increases and can enhance their employment
potentials in the long run, i.e. within future generations. We identify a substitution process
from energy intensive towards more labor intensive sectors gaining from new technological
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improvements. That means a substitution process of investment in pollution intensive sectors
towards more “clean” investment in new and environmental friendly technologies as well as
labor intensive sectors. Primary generations of the GAD scenario have to accept higher em-
ployment as well as consumption declines where generations in the long run can benefit by
increased development. Scenario OLG demonstrate the contrary results. GAD discounting
induces higher welfare losses to generations living in period 0 to 70 whereas the generations
living beyond these periods are better off due to GDP and investment increases.
5 Conclusions
An intergenerational discounting technique - GAD -, which actually takes into account
intergenerational peculiarities, leads to completely different statements than using the same
model with the conventional discounting method. Additionally, having in mind all affected gen-
erations throughout the relevant planning horizon, far-sighted policy necessitates the usage of
GAD due to its overall dominance with respect to overall welfare units in comparison to the
conventional OLG discounting method. Furthermore, applying GAD discounting leads to sus-
tainable paths of all economic variables at the expense of currently living ones. Their contribu-
tion to the achievement of "sustainability" can be interpreted as an application of an intertem-
poral polluter pays principle, where (negative) intertemporal externalities are - to a large extent
- avoided. This is not only fair from a normative viewpoint, but also efficient due to the inter-
nalization of today's occurring external costs with respect to climate change.
The achievement of the Kyoto emissions reduction target is guaranteed in the OLG scenario as
well as in the GAD one at every point in time of the planning horizon. However, in the OLG
scenario the society has to accept negative economic effects in the long run. All generations
throughout the whole planning horizon are affected by decreasing paths of the relevant macro
variables due to pronounced short-sightedness of today's living generations. In contrast, in the
GAD scenario previous generations reach the Kyoto target at the expense of GDP-units, con-
sumption units and increasing unemployment. But welfare reductions of current generations
are overcompensated by additional welfare units of future living ones. From a societal point of
view, the GAD scenario strictly dominates the OLG one due to higher overall societal welfare
present values, which can exemplary be seen in figure 2.
Additionally, the GAD scenario dominates not only the OLG one, but also the business as
usual path which is e.g. recommended by Nordhaus (1994) in his wait and see-strategy. This
can be seen in figure 5, where we plotted the per capita consumption path. For the next 90
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years, per capita consumption is lower in comparison to not abate any GHG-emissions at all.
However, beginning with year 2090, a sharp increase in per capita consumption can be iden-
tified. Extending our planning horizon would show that per capita consumption rises strictly
monotonous for several more decades. Thus, the result of Nordhaus (1994) - to adopt a policy
strategy of wait and see until better a understanding of climate change and better technologies
- is reversed: The longer we refrain from actions toward an improved environmental situation,
the further in the future positive changes of GDP, employment rates, and per capita con-
sumption occur and the higher is the burden share of today's living generations. Additionally,
the longer previous generations sink into inertia and delay with starting GHG-abatement, the
higher will be the probability for irreversibilities in climate change and the more serious will be
future economic and environmental burden for next generations.
Although the GAD scenario dominates the OLG one from a theoretical viewpoint, it is possible
that it is politically not acceptable even because of its far-sightedness. Each politician is mainly
interested in the perceived welfare of current living people, simply because unborn future ones
are not able to give her vote in (one of) the next elections. However, this is no neutral climate
policy undertaken by a welfare oriented government. These politicians bias their decisions
against future living generations, although there is - at least in industrialized countries - broad
consensus to take into account interests of future generations which is documented in all decla-
rations following the Earth Summit 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. Explicitly neglecting these state-
ments by using non-sustainable theoretical tools cannot be interpreted as serious policy-making
according to specified and, especially, in general accepted societal objectives.
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Appendix
Mathematical description of the GOLD model
GOLD is a dynamic OLG model and characterised by zero profit conditions, market equilibrium, income re-
strictions and trade relations (Armington).
The CES production structure follows the concept of ETA-MACRO combining nested capital and labour at
lower level. Energy is treated as a substitute of a capital labour composite determining together with material
inputs the overall output (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Production Structure
The representative producer of sector j ascertains the profit function
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with:
:DMja Domestic production share of total production by sector j
:Kja  Value share of capital within capital –energy composite
L
ja : Value share of labour within capital -energy -labour aggregate
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:Mja Value share of material within capital-energy-labour material aggregate
pj : Price of domestic good j
pFX: Price of foreign exchange (exchange rate)
pRK: Price of capital
:Ejp Price of energy
:Mjp Price of material
pL: Price of labour
sKE: Substitution elasticity between capital and energy
sKEL: Substitution elasticity between labour and capital and energy composite
sKLEM: Substitution elasticity between material and labour/ capital and energy- composite
Y:  Activity level of production sector j.
Domestically produced and imported goods are aggregated by an Armington good demanded by final demand
or by intermediate production as input factors within the economy. Profit function by Armington production is
specified by:
( )[ ] DMDMDM FXAjjAjAjAj papapp sss --- -+-=P 1 111 )1()(
with:
:Ajp Price of Armington good j
A
ja : Domestically produced good j value share of domestic and import good aggregate
pFX: Price of foreign exchange (exchange rate)
sDM: Substitution elasticity between domestically and imported good
Aj: Armington activity level
A composite energy good is produced by either conventional fossil fuels - oil, gas, and coal – represented by a
nested CES technology (with an elasticity of interfuel substitution sfuel ) or from a backstop source with Leon-
tief technology structures. Oil and gas can be substituted by an elasticity of substitution twice as large as the
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elasticity between their aggregate and coal. The energy good production is determined by final demand of in-
dustry and households.
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with:
ELE
ja : Electricity value share of energy aggregate by sector j
OIL
ja : Oil value share of fossil energy aggregate by sector j
GAS
ja : Gas value share of fossil energy aggregate by sector j
HCO
ja : Hard coal value share of coal aggregate by sector j
SCO
ja : Soft coal value share of coal aggregate by sector j
sELE : Substitution elasticity between electricity and fossil energy
sFOSSIL:  Substitution elasticity between fossil energy inputs
sCOA: Substitution elasticity between hard and soft coal
2,COOIL
jef : CO2 share of oil in sector j
2,COGAS
jef : CO2 share of gas in sector j
2,COHCO
jef : CO2 share of hard coalin sector j
2,COSCO
jef : CO2 share of soft coal in sector j
pCO2: Price of carbon
Ej: Activity level of energy production
Demanded energy by households is produced by a CES function:
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with:
E
HHia , : Value share of energy good i of household
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E
HHp : Price of energy by household demand
sEG: Substitution elasticities between energy goods
EHH: Activity level of energy production by household
The dynamic model is a growth model, i.e. within equilibrium conditions all sizes are rising by a same growth
rate. In the long run, a cap on emissions by an overall upper limit of emissions turns out to be difficult to meet.
Because of that a carbon free backstop technology can be utilised within future times at price fBS $/t CO2. Zero
profit condition is determined by:
BSCGCOBS fpp -=P 2
with:
pCG:Price of consumption good
fBS: Costs of carbon free energy supply
BS: Activity level of backstop technology
Capital is used for production with a capital price Ktp  and an utility price of 
RK
tp  and is depreciated by rate d:
K
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K
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K
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with:
K
tp : Price of capital in period t
RK
tp : Price of capital services in period t
Kt: Activity level of capital in period t
Investments are produced by Leontief technology:
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with:
I
ja : Value share investment of good j
It: Activity level of investments in period t
P: Time period
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Labor is supplied by household and demanded by firms, all household are confronted with a specific time quota be
spend for labor or leisure. This labor – leisure decision is determined by net wages ensuring a price elastic labor sup-
ply. Market clearance is determined by:
å åå
-=-= +¶
P¶
+
+¶
P¶
=
j
T
LTg
LLL
t
C
tg
tjLLL
t
Y
tj
T
LTg
END
tg tp
p
Y
tp
p
L
))1((
)(
))1((
)( ,
,
,
, ll
with:
END
tgL , Time budget in period t of household born in time period g
One household born in period g chooses a consumption path Cg,p maximizing its utility by considering the intertem-
poral budget constraint:
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where s  represents the intertemporal substitution elasticity, r depicts the (additional) pure time preference rate
of all living generations and Mg shows the present value of income. Present value of income is determined by
the discounted sum of future labor and non labor income.
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with:
END
tgL , : Labor endowment of household born in period g in time period t
NFt : Non labor income in time period t
qg,t : Share of non labor income in time period t of households born in time period g
Non labor income in period t can be calculated by the sum of balance of payment deficit or surplus and transfer
income:
NF = BOP + lLS TRANS
with:
BOP: Balance of payment deficit or surplus
Trans: Transfer income
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lLS: Adjustment multiplier of transfer income
Demand functions can be written as
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C
tgp , : Price of consumption aggregate in time period t
Mg: Income of household born in time period g
eg (p,Ug): Expenditure function of household born in time period g
Ug: Utility of household born in time period g
s: Intertemporal substitution elasticity
Expenditure function is determined by:
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qg,t: Value share of consumption in time period t of household born in time period g
By determining income and consumption paths saving Sg,t of all households can be calculated for each lifetime
period by the discounted sum of all expenditure surpluses of the remaining lifetime period.
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The primary factors, capital, labor, and energy are combined to produce output in period t. In addition, some
energy is delivered directly to final consumption. Output is separated in consumption and investment, invest-
ment enhances the (depreciated) capital stock of the next period. Capital, labor, and the energy resource earn
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incomes, which are either spent on consumption or saved. Saving equals investment through the usual identity
(see Figure 7).
Period t
Period t+1
Output t
Capital EnergyLabor
Capital
Consumption
Investment
Income
Savings
Figure 7: Dynamic structure
One representative agent of each generation by a region demands a composite consumption good produced by
combining the Armington good and the household energy aggregate good according to a CES configuration.
send describes the elasticity of substitution between the composite macro good and the energy aggregate. Aggre-
gate end-use energy is composed of oil, gas, and coal with an interfuel elasticity of substitution equal to one.
The backstop fuel is a perfect substitute for the energy aggregate. Purchase of the good is financed from the
value of the household's endowments of labor, capital, energy specific resources, and revenue from any carbon
tax or permit prices, respectively (see Figure 8).
Demand
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Figure 8: Final Demand Structure
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Mathematically, this dependence can be written:
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with:
pCG: Price of consumption good
CG
Ea : Value share of energy aggregate in final demand
CG
ia : Value share of non- energy good in final demand
CG:  Activity level of real consumption good production
